general "cognitive horsepower", limiting the critical diff erence to one particular domain, such as the understanding of social intentions (e.g., Herrmann, Hernandez-Lloreda, Call, Hare, & Tomasello 2010) . In his own attempt to identify and secure the last bastion of the uniquely human, Brandt remains within the classic framework of the rational animal but narrows the anthropological diff erence down to the ability to make judgments and state propositions as true or false.
What I will argue and provide evidence for in this paper, is that reducing uniquely human cognition to the ability to deal with propositions is "over-stingy", as Ryle (1962 Ryle ( /2009 puts it. Th e scope needs to be widened, as there are a myriad, maybe countless dramatic diff erences between human and animal cognition beyond and prior to judgment formation. Long before children have refi ned their conceptual capacities to a degree that allows them to explicitly affi rm or deny (positive or negative) propositions, their cognition diff ers drastically in all kinds of ways from that of animals. Th e ability to string conventional symbols together with the intent to claim that things are thus-and-so probably does not emerge before toddlerhood, and a full apprehension of the predicates "true" and "false" is not in place before school-age (Olson 1999). But even infants manifest various early linguistic, but also quasi-and pre-linguistic performances for which there are no analoga rationis in animals either. Judgments are thus only the tip (or some other part) of the iceberg of unique human cognition.
In his brief and roughly sketched evolutionary story of the emergence of thought on p. 48, Brandt sees a developmental milestone in the pointing gesture thanks to its role in opening up a public space. But he does not devote much attention to the ontogeny of this step, although it is here, in the course of individual development, that we can actually observe the distinctiveness of human thought unfold. In this paper, I shall fi ll this void by identifying and analysing ontogenetic precursors of what according to Brandt characterizes human cognition: judgments and truth-functional negation.
First, I will take a close look at pointing gestures and early verbal productions dubbed "holophrases", both of which emerge during infancy. Th ese referential acts-which are often used in combination-can be regarded as proto-declaratives (Bates 1976) because the child points out something for us to attend to as a topic. Even though subject and predicate are not yet diff erentiated, it is here that the stage for predication is set. Th ese precursors of structured propositions are just as peculiar to humans.
Second, I will trace the development of proto-negations such as rejections, refusals, prohibitions, references to disappearances or missing objects ("All gone" in English, "Alle-alle" or "Weg" in German) and lack of success ("Doesn't work!", "Doesn't fi t!" in English; "Geht nicht!", "Passt nicht!" in German). Even though animals reject things and can refuse actions, there are marked qualitative diff er-
